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I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, trial courts have been cautious about allowing
juries to hear testimony from scientific experts. When a testifying
expert professes to have knowledge in a specialized field, juries often
find sorting out issues of credibility and relevance difficult and confus-
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ing.' Therefore, federal courts traditionally have attempted to exclude
expert testimony if its basis has not yet gained a requisite degree of
acceptance within a relevant community of experts. 2 The justification
for this limitation is that those people who are in the best position to
understand and evaluate this evidence-other experts-should make
judgments about the reliability of scientific evidence.3 This contingent
admissibility provides both advantages and disadvantages. It
immediately ensures that admitted testimony will be sensible, prob-
able, and rooted in principles of science accepted by a majority of
experts in a field; at the same time, it arguably excludes potentially
useful cutting-edge theories merely because they have not yet been
subjected to sufficient peer review. 4
Although any standard for the admissibility of expert testi-
mony that is based on peer review is imperfect, the federal courts
historically have preferred to accept this double-edged sword rather
than relax the standard and confuse juries. 5 In 1975, however, Con-
gress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence, which contain provisions
specifically addressing the admissibility of expert testimony.6 The
Rules' test of admissibility is broad and does not mention excluding
testimony based on theories or techniques that are not generally
1. See United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1975) (stating, "There are good
reasons why not every ostensibly scientific technique should be recognized as the basis for expert
testimony. Because of its apparent objectivity, an opinion that claims a scientific basis is apt to
carry undue weight with the trier of fact.").
2. The court in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), first articulated
the rule behind this general trend:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental
and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evi-
dential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in
admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discov-
ery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Id.
3. See United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (asserting that "[t]he
requirement of general acceptance in the scientific community assures that those most qualified
to assess the general validity of a scientific method will have the determinative voice").
4. For example, in the past, courts have excluded gunshot residue tests, State v. Smith, 50
Ohio App. 2d 183, 362 N.E.2d 1239 (1976), testimony based on voiceprints, Reed v. State, 283 Md.
374,, 391 A.2d 364 (1978), tape recordings of sodium pentothal interviews, Lindsey v. United
States, 237 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1956), and evidence derived from ion microprobic analysis, United
States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977), from trials for not having gained a requisite degree
of general acceptance among experts. Arguably, some of this evidence could have enlightened
jurors about facts in dispute in these cases.
5. See Part H.A.
6. Rule 702 covers the admission of testimony by experts. It states: "If scientific, techni-
cal, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to de-
termine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FRE 702.
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accepted by a proposed expert's professional peers.7 Because the Rules
theoretically establish a fairly complete integration of the criteria for
admitting evidence in federal courts,8 commentators have debated the
continued usefulness and vitality of a peer review standard.9
In the recent case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,10 the Supreme Court rejected the general acceptance standard as
the litmus test of admissibility for expert testimony.,, The Court held
that a more complex inquiry must guide judges in applying the Rules'
broad test of admissibility and that this more comprehensive standard
had superseded the general acceptance requirement. 12  Litigators
should not underestimate Daubert's potential impact on future litiga-
tion and should realize that the case threatens to have a number of
negative ramifications.
Part II of this Recent Development describes the legal back-
ground in which Daubert was decided. It sets forth the traditional
common-law standard for admitting expert testimony and explains
how the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence brought the
continued vitality of that standard into question. Part III describes
the facts of Daubert, explains the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the appropriate standard for admitting expert testimony under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, and details Chief Justice Rehnquist's
dissent. Part IV analyzes some of the issues unresolved by the
Supreme Court's opinion in Daubert and describes some of the
problems that Daubert may create. Part V then suggests that the
7. Id. See also Part I.B.
8. FRE 101 states the scope of the Federal Rules of Evidence: "These rules govern
proceedings in the courts of the United States and before United States bankruptcy judges and
United States magistrates... ." FRE 101.
In United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984), the Supreme Court considered the pertinence of
background common law in interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence. Abel held that although
the Rules occupy the field, consistent common law nevertheless could serve as an aid in their
interpretation. The Court quoted Professor Cleary, the Rules' Reporter: "In principle, under the
Federal Rules no common law of evidence remains. 'All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided .... ' In reality, of course, the body of common law knowledge continues to
exist, though in the somewhat altered form of a source of guidance in the exercise of delegated
powers." Id. at 51-52.
9. See, for example, Jack B. Weinstein and Margaret A. Berger, 3 Weinstein's Evidence
702[03] at 702-36 (Bender, 1988) (arguing that the enactment of the Rules eliminated the
traditional peer review standard); Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific
Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half Century Later, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197, 1229 (1980)
(arguing that the traditional peer review standard, in fact, may have survived the Rules' enact-
ment). See also Stephen A. Saltzburg and Kenneth R. Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual
452 (Michie, 3d ed. 1982) (arguing the same).
10. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
11. Id. at 2793.
12. See id. at 2794-95.
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process of screening expert testimony could be improved and clarified
by modifying Rule 702 to establish a more concrete legislative
determination of the criteria required for the admission of this
evidence.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND-EXCLUDING UNRELIABLE EXPERT
TESTIMONY BEFORE DAUBERT
A. The General Acceptance Test: Frye v. United States
For many years, the common-law general acceptance test first
enunciated in Frye v. United States 3 was the principal defense against
unreliable scientific testimony in the federal courts.14  To prevent
experts from confusing juries by presenting junk science theories that
had relatively little scientific basis or merit, courts only admitted
testimony derived from principles that were generally accepted in the
appropriate scientific community. 5 This simple head-counting stan-
dard,16 based on the value and merits of peer review and grounded in
a realization that judges are limited in both their time and scientific
knowledge, served federal courts fairly well. It established a bright-
line procedure recognizing that a courtroom should not be a testing
ground for novel scientific breakthroughs nor a stage for a battle of
the experts. 17  Occasionally, courts undoubtedly excluded valid
13. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
14. See generally Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2792.
15. Frye, 293 F. at 1014. 'Junk science* is a pejorative term describing novel scientific
testimony that has only a weak grounding in established and well-tested principles or methods. It
refers to evidence that is held out to the trier of fact as scientific but lacks the element of
reliability normally associated with that type of information. Courts and commentators have
recognized the danger presented by making this testimony available to juries, see note 1, but junk
science nevertheless represents a growing problem in complex, modern litigation.
16. One potential weakness of the Frye test is that it contemplates that courts merely win
need to make a head count of how many well-credentialed experts in the relevant field accept or
support a certain method or theory, and how many do not. The general acceptance test requires
some majority or preponderance of the experts to support the scientific foundation of the
testimony in question. The Frye test does not require, however, that the court itself become
substantively involved in the issue of testimonial reliability as does the newly created Daubert
test.
17. One commentator noted:
Imposition of the Frye test serves to (1) insure that a minimal reserve of experts exists
who can critically examine the validity of a scientific determination in a particular case,
(2) promote a degree of uniformity of decision, (3) avoid the interjection of a time consum-
ing and often misleading determination of the reliability of a scientific technique into the
litigation, (4) assure that scientific evidence introduced will be reliable and relevant, (5)
provide a preliminary screening to protect against the natural inclination of the jury to
1178
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theories, and in a few cases, perhaps justice was not well served by
the Frye test.' Despite these exclusions, the majority of federal cases
conducted under Frye benefitted from three aspects of its test. First,
the Frye test allowed juries to function without the confusion of
conflicting scientific banter.' 9 Second, courts had a chance to clear
their dockets by avoiding tricky, scientific questions normally foreign
to judges. Finally, a proposed expert's peers, rather than an
overworked and underinformed judge or an overtrusting and easily
distracted jury, determined the expert's credibility and reliability.
20
Frye itself involved the appeal of a convicted murderer who had
attempted to introduce at trial the testimony of an expert in systolic
blood pressure deception tests. 2' Prior to the trial, the defendant had
taken this test, which indicated that he was truthful when claiming
his innocence. 22 At trial, the court did not permit Frye's attorney to
introduce the testimony of the scientist who had conducted the test,23
nor did the court allow the expert to conduct a second test in front of
the jury.2 4 After his conviction, Frye appealed to the District of
assign significant weight to scientific techniques presented under circumstances in which
the trier of fact is in a poor position to place an accurate evaluation upon reliability, and
(6) impose a threshold standard of reliability in light of the fact that cross-examination by
opposing counsel is unlikely to bring inaccuracies to the attention of the jury.
Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence §703.2 at 647 (West, 3d ed. 1991) (citing
Bailer, 519 F.2d at 466, and Addison, 498 F.2d at 743-44).
18. Of course, a time lag arises between the time at which a valid theory or method is dis-
covered and when it becomes generally accepted. During this period, testimony based on novel
scientific theories traditionally has been barred under Frye. Some of this barred testimony is
later found to be based on valid scientific presumptions, and excluding the evidence could allow a
jury to make decisions without having access to all relevant information.
19. See generally Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 703.2 at 647 n.4 (cited in note
17).
20. See Addison, 498 F.2d at 743-44.
21. The systolic blood pressure deception test was a precursor to the modern lie detector
test:
It is asserted that blood pressure is influenced by change in the emotions of the witness,
and that the systolic blood pressure rises are brought about by nervous impulses sent to
the sympathetic branch of the automatic nervous system. Scientific experiments, it is
claimed, have demonstrated that fear, rage, and pain always produce a rise of systolic
blood pressure; and that conscious deception or falsehood, concealment of facts, or guilt of
crime, accompanied by fear of detection when the person is under examination, raises the
systolic blood pressure in a curve, which corresponds exactly to the struggle going on in
the subject's mind, between fear and attempted control of that fear, as the examination
touches the vital points in respect of which he is attempting to deceive the examiner.
Frye, 293 F. at 1013-14.




Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the district court's
refusal to admit the expert's testimony was improper.2 5
In affirming Frye's conviction, the D.C. Circuit established the
rule that became the universal common-law test of admissibility for
expert testimony: Courts will admit testimony deduced from scientific
principles or discoveries, but the theory or technique on which the
expert relies must be sufficiently established as to have gained gen-
eral acceptance in the particular scientific field to which it belongs.26
The Frye court recognized that the simplest way to ensure testimonial
reliability was to require scientific testimony to pass the test of peer
review. Thus, the court concluded that the systolic blood pressure
deception test had not gained enough standing and recognition among
physiological and psychological authorities to justify the admission of
testimony deduced from its application.
27
Since its birth more than seventy years ago, the Frye test
worked against the introduction of dubious scientific theories in fed-
eral courts.28 Until the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in
1975, Frye was clearly the prevailing standard in federal courts.29 Its
test has determined the admissibility of many types of scientific evi-
dence, including voiceprints,30 neutron activation,3 1 gunshot residue
tests,3 2 bite-mark comparisons,3 3 sodium pentothal3 4 ion microprobic
analyses,35 and blood-grouping tests.3 6 Even after the enactment of
the Rules in 1975, ten of the thirteen federal circuits continued to
apply the general acceptance test.37 These courts allowed the test to
coexist with Rule 702, which governs the admissibility of expert tes-
25. Id.
26. Id. See note 2 for the language used by the court.
27. Id.
28. As previously discussed, courts traditionally have recognized the importance of keeping
testimony that could confuse a jury out of the courtroom, and have sought to eliminate the
introduction of far-fetched ideas cloaked in an appearance of scientific authority. Lawmakers fear
that juries may be tempted to take this testimony at face value, rather than second-guess a
scientific expert. For this reason, many arnici in Daubert strongly supported the rather restric-
tive Frye test. Junk science is a particular problem today in toxic tort and other complex litiga-
tion.
29. See the discussion in United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1234-35 (3d Cir. 1985).
30. See, for example, Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374,391 A.2d 364,381 (1978).
31. See, for example, United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 436, 438, 441 (6th Cir. 1970).
32. See, for example, State v. Smith, 50 Ohio App. 2d 183, 362 N.E.2d 1239, 1246 (1976).
33. See, for example, People v. Slone, 76 Cal. App. 3d 611, 143 Cal. Rptr. 61, 68 (1978).
34. See, for example, Lindsey v. United States, 237 F.2d 893, 896 (9th Cir. 1956).
35. See, for example, United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556-57, 558 (6th Cir. 1977).
36. See, for example, People v. Alston, 79 Misc. 2d 1077, 1085, 362 N.Y.S.2d 356, 362 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1974).
37. Timothy B. Dyk and Gregory A. Castanias, Daubert Doesn't End Debate on Experts, 15
Nat'l L. J. 17 (Aug. 2, 1993). Only the Second and Third Circuits expressly rejected Frye after
1975. See Part II.C.
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timony.38 In addition, Frye became the law in many of the states that
adopted the Uniform Rules of Evidence, the model for the Federal
Rules of Evidence.31
B. The Federal Rules of Evidence
Rules 401, 402, 403, and 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
are pertinent to the admissibility of expert testimony. Rule 401 de-
fines "relevant evidence" as evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of a material fact more or less probable. 4° Rule 402 states
that all relevant evidence is generally admissible and that irrelevant
evidence is not.4' Rule 403 allows courts to exclude evidence, although
relevant, if its probative value is outweighed by considerations of
prejudice, confusion, or wastefulness.4 Rule 702 establishes the spe-
cific standard for admitting expert testimony: "If scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." 3
38. FRE 702. One view holds that the key to reconciling the common-law Frye test with
Rule 702 lies in Rule 403, which states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." FRE 403. Some proponents of retaining the Frye test in
conjunction with the Federal Rules argue that when the Rules are silent regarding a common-law
rule, the common-law rule should survive if it is consistent with the Rules. Accordingly, the Frye
test should survive, because it excludes dubious scientific evidence (which has not gained general
acceptance) for the same reasons that Rule 403 would exclude the evidence-this novel testimony
may mislead, confuse, prejudice, or delay the jury. See Dyk and Castanias, 15 Nat'l L. J. at 18.
39. Dyk and Castanias, 15 Nat'l L. J. at 18 (cited in note 37).
40. "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence." FRE 401.
41. "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of
the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." FRE
402.
42. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by




C. A Split Among the Circuits
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not invoke peer review as a
prerequisite for admitting expert testimony.44 Neither the Advisory
Committee Notes regarding Rule 702, 45 the relevant congressional
floor debates and hearings,4 nor the relevant congressional committee
reports 47 shed light on Congress's intent to perpetuate or eliminate
Frye. After the enactment of the Rules, questions about the status of
Frye lingered. Did the Rules' silence regarding Frye mean that courts
should abandon the peer review standard, or could the common-law
test continue to exist in conjunction with the Rules? Before Daubert,
judges, scholars, and the federal circuit courts were divided on the
issue.
1. The Coexistence of Frye and the Federal Rules
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert, a majority of
the federal circuit courts had held that the Frye test continued to
impact the admissibility of expert testimony despite the enactment of
the Rules.4 The Fifth Circuit held, for example, that the Rules, com-
bined with Frye, provide the framework for trial judges struggling
with proffered expert testimony.49 The court offered four inquiries to
help trial judges evaluate the admissibility of expert testimony: (1)
whether the witness is qualified to express an expert opinion under
Rule 702, ° (2) whether the facts on which the expert relies are of the
same type relied on by other experts in the field as required by Rule
703,51 (3) whether in reaching her conclusion the expert used a well-
44. See FRE 702.
45. See Advisory Committee's Notes at 56 F.R.D. 183 (1973).
46. See Proposed Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Reform
of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973);
Federal Rules of Evidence: Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
47. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. Rep. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
48. Only the Second and Third Circuits explicitly proclaimed the end of the Frye test. See
U.S. v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978); U.S. v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1232 (3d Cir.
1985). See also U.S. v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992). The Fourth Circuit turned away
from Frye more subtly. See Clinchfield R.R. Co. v. Lynch, 784 F.2d 545, 553-54 (4th Cir. 1986)
(not explicitly abandoning Frye yet significantly choosing not to apply Frye in a case in which an
expert's technique was not generally accepted but seemed reliable).
49. Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1991).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1110-11. Rule 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or infer-
ence may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If
1182 [Vol. 47:1175
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founded methodology as required by Frye (essentially a generally
accepted methodology)62 and (4) whether the testimony's potential for
unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value as enun-
ciated in Rule 403.5
The Fifth Circuit noted that under the Frye test, an expert's
opinion need not be generally accepted before it can be sufficiently
reliable and probative to support a jury finding.54 The Frye test fo-
cuses on an expert's methodology, which must pass the test of peer
review, not on an expert's conclusions themselves. 55 When analyzing
the reliability of an expert's methodology, a court must determine
whether the methodology connects the facts to the conclusion in a
scientifically valid, or generally accepted, way.m If the expert's meth-
odology passes the test of peer review, the probative value or weight
that the expert's opinion will be given is left to the sound judgment of
the jury.5 By making the Frye inquiry one of Rule 702's implicit re-
quirements of admissibility, many federal courts found a way to con-
tinue to defer to the scientific community on the issue of reliability.
2. The Minority Position: Frye and the Rules Are Mutually Exclusive
At the time Daubert was decided, only the Second and Third
Circuits expressly had abandoned the Frye test in favor of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.58 The Second Circuit was the first to do so, criticiz-
of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
FRE 703.
52. Chrietophersen, 939 F.2d at 1111.
53. Id. at 1112. See FRE 403.
54. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1111 (quoting Osburn v. Anchor Laboratories, Inc., 825 F.2d
908, 915 (5th Cir. 1987)).
55. See generally Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 Fordham L. Rev.
595 (1988).
56. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1115.
57. Id. at 1106.
58. The Second Circuit was the first to proclaim that Frye was dead. In United States v.
Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), the court stated that "[a] determination of reliability
cannot rest solely on a process of 'counting (scientific) noses.'... In testing for admissibility of a
particular type of scientific evidence, whatever the scientific 'voting' pattern may be, the courts
cannot in any event surrender to scientists the responsibility for determining the reliability of
that evidence." Id. at 1198. The Second Circuit reaffirmed its commitment to a flexible test of
admissibility not limited by Frye in United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992).
The Third Circuit followed the Second Circuit's lead in United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d
1224 (3d Cir. 1985). In rejecting Frye, the Third Circuit described some of the strengths and
weaknesses of Frye's peer review standard before setting it aside in favor of a more flexible
approach for determining reliability. Downing provided another model for the Supreme Court's
decision in Daubert.
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ing Frye for turning determinations of scientific credibility into simple
nose counts of experts, instead of demanding that judges themselves
focus on the issue of scientific reliability. 59 Rather than allow the
admissibility of expert testimony to rely solely on the results of peer
review, in U.S. v. Williams °60 the Second Circuit envisioned a broader
inquiry.61
The court focused its test of the reliability of scientific evidence
on critical characteristics like the potential rate of error of any scien-
tific techniques that the expert used 6 2 the existence and maintenance
of standards controlling these techniques,63 the care and concern with
which the techniques had been employed,6 4 and whether or not the
techniques lend themselves to abuse.65 This comprehensive, multifac-
tor analysis was the forerunner to the one described by the Supreme
Court's general observations in Daubert.66 The Second Circuit's opin-
ion, decided only three years after the enactment of the Rules, pro-
vided support for many critics of Frye who saw the enactment of the
liberal Rules as the perfect opportunity to move away from the con-
servatism of the peer review standard.
In United States v. Downing,6 7 the Third Circuit did not deter-
mine conclusively that the Rules automatically superseded Frye but
held that the status of the Frye test under the Rules was somewhat
uncertain.68 In rejecting Frye for reasons of policy, the court gave a
detailed explanation of its decision.69 The Downing court first re-
While only the Second and Third Circuits purposefully had declared Frye dead, the Fourth
Circuit joined them in spirit. See Clinchfield RR. Co. v. Lynch, 784 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1986)
(rejecting Frye in not so many words).
59. Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198.
60. Id. at 1194.
61. Id. at 1198-99.
62. Id. at 1198.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1199.
65. Id. at 1198-99.
66. Justice Blackmun invoked a similar analysis in Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
67. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
68. The Court noted:
[W]e can assume that the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence were aware that the
Frye test was a judicial creation, and we find nothing in the language of the rules to sug-
gest a disapproval of such interstitial judicial rulemaking. Therefore, although the codifi-
cation of the rules of evidence may counsel in favor of a re-examination of the general ac-
ceptance standard, on balance we conclude that the Federal Rules of Evidence neither in-
corporate nor repudiate it.
Id. at 1235.
69. The Third Circuit's opinion in Downing is particularly relevant to an understanding of
Daubert because it is a comprehensive opinion, discussing the strengths and weaknesses of Frye's
general acceptance-peer review standard and interpreting Rule 702. The Supreme Court in




marked that because the Frye test was the dominant standard at the
time the Rules were adopted, one might expect the Rules to address
specifically the issue of whether Frye would survive .70 Neither the text
of the Rules nor the Advisory Committee Notes, however, articulated
a clear standard for admitting expert testimony.7 1 The Downing court
noted that although commentators had agreed that this legislative
silence was significant, they disagreed about its meaning.72
As previously discussed, one view was that the general accep-
tance test had survived the enactment of the Rules and should con-
tinue to determine the admissibility of expert testimony.7 3 This view
was rooted in the idea that Rule 702 does not set forth a completely
integrated standard of admissibility but allows for some consideration
of public policy in determining what testimony is relevant and what
testimony courts should exclude. Accordingly, the continued applica-
tion of Frye merely represented the way that federal courts had re-
sponded to policy concerns regarding the danger of allowing juries to
hear novel scientific testimony.
The other view of Rule 702's silence regarding Frye maintained
that courts should consider the silence to be a purposeful rejection of
the general acceptance requirement.7 4 Proponents of this view argued
that the Frye test was inconsistent with the liberal policies behind the
Rules. 75 In theory, the Rules were intended to allow more, not less,
evidence to be admitted. Hence, a decision concerning the relevance of
novel scientific testimony arguably should turn on more than just its
position in the scientific community.7 6 A rigid and narrow test of
70. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1234.
71. Id. See also Advisory Committee Notes at 56 F.R.D. 183 (1973).
72. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1233 (citing Saltzburg and Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence
Manual at 452 (cited in note 9)); Giannelli, 80 Colum. L. Rev. at 1249-50 (cited in note 9).
73. See Downing, 753 F.2d at 1234 (citing David W. Louisell and Christopher B. Mueller, 1
Federal Evidence §105 at 818 (Law Co-op, 1977) (stating that "[p]robably the general scientific ac-
ceptance approach has survived the enactment of the Federal Rules, and will continue to be
appL.,d in determining the relevancy of such proof under Rule 401")); Saltzburg and Redden,
Federal Rules of Evidence Manual at 452 (cited in note 9) (stating that "[i]t would be odd if the
Advisory Committee and the Congress intended to overrule the vast majority of cases excluding
such evidence as lie detectors without explicitly stating so"); Giannelli, 80 Colum. L. Rev. at 1228-
29 (cited in note 9).
74. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1234 (citing Weinstein and Berger, 3 Weinstein's Evidence
702[03] at 702-16 (cited in note 9) (stating that "[t]he silence of rule [702] and its drafters should
be regarded as tantamount to an abandonment of the general acceptance standard")). But see
State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 503 (Me. 1978) (interpreting the Maine Rules of Evidence, which
are patterned after the Federal Rules, as not incorporating Frye).
75. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1234. See also Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
76. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1235.
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relevance would run contrary to the liberal intent of the Rules."
Eventually, the Supreme Court adopted this view when it finally
addressed the fate of Frye in its Daubert decision.78
The Third Circuit declined to join either side of the disagree-
ment. 9 Instead, it held in Downing that the Rules neither incorpo-
rated nor repudiated Frye.8 The court decided to make its own inde-
pendent determination of whether the general acceptance test should
survive under the Rules.81
The Downing court pointed out that Frye's principal strength
was that it provided a method for courts to use when assessing the
reliability of novel scientific evidence.82 The test guarded against the
possible ill effects of admitting testimony derived from unproven
methodology.m Despite these virtues, critics of the general acceptance
requirement considered it vague and overly conservative." Frye's
vagueness arguably allows courts that wish to admit evidence to limit
the impact of the test by defining the relevant scientific community as
only those experts who customarily use the technique in question.85
The Downing court noted that courts may interpret "general accep-
tance" as they please.6 For instance, judicial definitions of "general
acceptance" range from "widespread; prevalent; extensive though not
77. Some commentators have implied that Rule 702 independently provides almost no
limits on admissibility that are not provided by the Rules as a whole. McCormick advocates the
replacement of the strict, peer review threshold of Frye with an admissibility test based more on
logical relevancy, as provided by Rule 401, and on probative value and lack of prejudice, as
provided by Rule 403:
General scientific acceptance is a proper condition for taking judicial notice of scientific
facts, but it is not a suitable criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence. Any rele-
vant conclusions supported by a qualified expert witness should be received unless there
are distinct reasons for exclusion. These reasons are the familiar ones of prejudicing or
misleading the jury or consuming undue amounts of time.
Edward W. Cleary, ed., McCormick on Evidence § 203 at 608 (West, 3d ed. 1984). The Supreme
Court did not read the Rules as liberally. In Daubert, the Court held that Rule 702 incorporates
its own somewhat heightened standards of reliability and relevance.
78. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
79. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1235.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. (citing United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
83. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1235 (citing United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir.
1977)).
84. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1236 (citing Louisell and Mueller, 1 Federal Evidence § 105 at 821
(cited in note 73)); Giannelli, 80 Colum. L. Rev. at 1249-50 (cited in note 9).
85. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1236 (citing People v. Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 858, 331
P.2d 251, 254 (1958) (holding that the Frye test was satisfied by showing general acceptance by
those who are expected to be familiar with the challenged technique despite the admission of the
prosecution's own expert that the technique lacked acceptance within the medical profession as a
whole)).
86. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1236.
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universal"87 to a "substantial section of the scientific community."8
The court criticized other aspects of Frye as well, including courts'
selectivity in applying the test, the inadequacy of expert testimony
available concerning many specialized issues due to the use of the
test, and the uncritical reliance on prior judicial, rather than scientific,
determinations of reliability that the test encourages. 9
In the end, the Third Circuit chose to set the Frye test aside,
applying only the Rules.90 It stated that the Frye test had become too
malleable to ensure orderly and uniform results.' Additionally, in its
original form, the general acceptance standard displays a conserva-
tism that runs contrary to the spirit of the Rules.92 The Downing
decision addressed many issues that the Supreme Court found com-
pelling when it later decided the fate of Frye in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals.
3
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENT: DAUBERT V. MERRELL Dow
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.-FEDERAL TRIAL JUDGES AS THE
GATEKEEPERS OF RELIABILITY
On June 28, 1993, the Supreme Court handed down its deci-
sion in Daubert4.9  The majority opinion settled the split among the
circuits as to whether the liberal Rules should trump Frye's strict, peer
review test for admitting expert testimony.9 5 In a seven-to-two deci-
sion, Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, held that the Rules
had displaced Frye.96 In dicta, the majority also made general obser-
vations about the pertinent questions that a federal judge must ask
when determining the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule
702.97 This dicta has radically altered expectations of how federal trial
judges will approach the admission of expert testimony.
87. Id. (citing United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685, 688 ().D.C. 1972), rev'd, 475 F.2d
1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
88. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1236 (quoting United States v. Williams, 443 F. Supp. 269, 273
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978)).
89. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1236 (citing Giannelli, 80 Colum. L. Rev. at 1208-21 (cited in note
9)); Louisell and Mueler, 1 Federal Evidence § 105 at 821 (cited in note 73).
90. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1237.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
94. Id.
95. It was for this purpose that the Court granted certiorari. 113 S. Ct. at 2792.
96. Id. at 2794.




Daubert involved typical issues of causation in a products li-
ability case. The plaintiffs were the parents of children who had been
born with severe limb deformities.98 They claimed that these birth
defects were the result of the mothers' prescribed use of Bendectin, an
anti-nausea drug manufactured by Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.9
After removing the case to federal court, Merrell Dow moved for
summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs had insufficient evi-
dence to prove that Bendectin had caused the children's injuries.c ° To
support its position, Merrell Dow presented an affidavit from an
epidemiologist who was a recognized expert on the risks associated
with exposure to certain chemical substances.1o1 The doctor had exam-
ined some thirty published studies of over 130,000 patients and con-
cluded that no study indicated that Bendectin was capable of causing
birth defects.12
The plaintiffs responded by submitting the affidavits of eight
other well-credentialed experts °s who stated that Bendectin could
cause birth defects.1°4 The experts' conclusions were based on in vitro
(test tube) and in vivo (live) animal studies of Bendectin, pharma-
cological studies of the drug, and the re-analysis of other published
epidemiological (human statistical) studies.10 5 Merrell Dow argued
that this evidence was not admissible because the testimony of the
plaintiffs' experts contradicted the weight of scientific authority.10°
The District Court for the Southern District of California granted
Merrell Dow's motion for summary judgment, stating that it would
98. Id. at 2791-97.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. Dr. Lamm, the defendant's expert, received his M.D. from the University of South-
ern California and "served as a consultant in birth-defect epidemiology for the National Center for
Health Statistics." Id. at 2791 n.1.
102. Id. at 2791.
103. The Court noted the experts' credentials:
For example, Shanna Helen Swan, who received a master's degree in biostatics from
Columbia University and a doctorate in statistics from the University of California at
Berkeley, is chief of the section of the California Department of Health and Services that
determines causes of birth defects, and has served as a consultant to the World Health
Organization, the Food and Drug Administration, and the National Institutes of Health.
Stewart A. Newman, who received his master's and a doctorate in chemistry from
Columbia University and the University of Chicago, respectively, is a professor at New
York Medical College and has spent over a decade studying the effect of chemicals on limb
development.
Id. at 2791 n.2 (citations omitted).
104. Id. at 2791.
105. Id. at 2791-92.
106. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570,575 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
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allow the scientific evidence to be admitted only if the principle from
which it was derived was sufficiently established to have won general
acceptance among experts in the field from which the evidence
derived. °7 Given the epidemiological data available concerning
Bendectin, the district court held that expert testimony not based on
human studies was inadmissible.01 The court also held that the
plaintiffs' experts' opinions, based on recalculations of previously
published data, were inadmissible partially because they had not been
subjected to peer review. °9
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding, citing
Frye.110 It stated that expert testimony based on a scientific technique
is admissible only if the technique is generally accepted by the scien-
tific community and held that the plaintiffs' evidence did not pass this
test.' It specifically noted that other federal circuit courts consider-
ing the risks of Bendectin also had refused to admit re-analyses of
epidemiological studies not subjected to peer review." 2  These re-
analyses, the court stated, were particularly problematic in light of
the thirty published studies supporting Merrell Dow's position." 3
Courts usually only accept re-analyses that have been subjected to
verification and scrutiny by other experts in the scientific
community.1 4 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to settle the
sharp division among the federal circuit courts regarding the proper
standard for the admission of expert testimony."5
B. The Majority Opinion
Justice Blackmun began the majority opinion in Daubert by
acknowledging that the Frye test of admissibility had been the domi-
nant standard for seventy years." 6 He noted, however, that although
107. Id. at 572 (quoting United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508,510 (9th Cir. 1978)).
108. Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 575.
109. Id.
110. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1129 (9th Cir. 1991)
(quoting United States v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522, 1526 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Frye, 293 F. 1013)).
111. Daubert, 951 F.2d at 1131.
112. Id. at 1130-31 (citing DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941 (3d
Cir. 1990)); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307, modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th
Cir. 1989); Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Lynch v.
Merrell-National Labs, 830 F.2d 1190 (lst Cir. 1987).
113. Daubert, 951 F.2d at 1130.
114. Id. at 1131.
115. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2792.
116. Id.
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courts and commentators had debated the merits of Frye,117 the in-
stant case was not concerned with its merits, but rather its continuing
authority.118 The Court held that the enactment of the Rules indeed
had displaced Frye."9
Justice Blackmun's analysis of the matter began with Rule
402, which provides that relevant evidence is admissible unless pre-
cluded by the Constitution, Congress, the other Federal Rules of
Evidence, or the Supreme Court acting pursuant to statutory author-
ity. 20 Relevant evidence, according to Rule 401, is defined as evidence
having a tendency to make the existence of any material fact more or
less probable.' 2' These broad statements led Justice Blackmun to
interpret the Rules' standard of relevance very liberally.122
The Federal Rules of Evidence occupy the field; 23 therefore, the
Court held that only common-law authority consistent with the Rules
could continue to apply.124 Yet, in the case of the admissibility of
expert testimony, a specific Rule governs. 25 The text of Rule 702 does
not establish general acceptance as an explicit prerequisite to admis-
sibility. 126 Justice Blackmun noted that the legislative history of the
117. Id. at 2793 (citing Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in
Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 643 (1992); Edward R. Becker and Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Six.
teen Years-The Effect of "Plain Meaning" Jurisprudence, The Need for an Advisory Committee on
the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
857,876-85 (1992); Black, 56 Fordham L. Rev. 595 (cited in note 55); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The
"Bases" of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. Rev. 1
(1988); Proposals for a Model Rule on the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 26 Jurimetrics J.
235 (1986); Giannelli, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197 (cited in note 9); The Supreme Court, 1986 Term:
Leading Cases, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 119, 125-27 (1987)).
118. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2793. Justice Blackmun noted that, like the question of Frye's
merits, the dispute over Frye's survival also has divided courts and commentators. Id. at n.5.
See, for example, United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978) (asserting that Frye is
superseded by the Rules); Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1115-16 (5th Cir.
1991) (stating that Frye and the Rules coexist); Weinstein and Berger, 3 Weinstein's Evidence
702[03] at 702-36 to 702-37 (cited in note 9) (asserting that Frye is dead); Graham, Handbook of
Federal Evidence § 703.2 (cited in note 17) (arguing that Frye lives).
119. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2793.
120. Id. at 2793-94 (citing FRE 402).
121. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794 (citing FRE 401).
122. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
123. Id. (citing United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 49 (1984)).
124. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794. In Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984), the Court held that a common-
law rule of evidence was entirely consistent with Rule 402's general requirement of admissibility
and considered it unlikely that the drafters of the Rules meant to change the common law. In
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987), however, the Court was unable to find a particu-
lar common-law doctrine in the Rules and therefore held that the common law had been
superseded.
125. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794 (citing FRE 702).
126. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
1190
EXPERT TESTIMONY
Rules does not mention the Frye test,1 27 and consistent with Downing,
he stated that a rigid test like the Frye test would conflict with the
liberal nature of the Rules and their general policy of relaxing the
traditional rules barring opinion testimony.128  He stated that the
Rules' permissive thrust and the inclusion of a particular Rule govern-
ing expert testimony that does not invoke peer review make the idea
that the Rules assimilated Frye unconvincing.1 29
Justice Blackmun was quick to note, however, that, despite the
abandonment of the Frye test, the Rules do place limits on expert
testimony.1 30 Under the Rules, trial judges must ensure that all scien-
tific testimony is not only relevant but also reliable. 13 Rather than
simply rely on this theoretical explanation of Rule 702, the Court
decided to detail the nature and source of the trial judge's duty as the
gatekeeper of expert testimony. 132
Rule 702 contemplates some restriction of the subjects and
theories about which an expert may testify.133 Justice Blackmun
stated that in the text of Rule 702, the word "scientific" implies that
testimony must be grounded in the methods and procedures of sci-
ence,1 34 and the word "knowledge" connotes more than subjective belief
and unsupported speculation.135 He found that to be considered
"scientific knowledge," an assertion must be derived from use of the
scientific method.136 Thus, Rule 702 requires expert testimony to
possess a degree of evidentiary reliability.137 The Rule further
requires that admitted testimony be capable of assisting the trier of
127. Id.
128. Id. (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)). See also Jack B.
Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence Is Sound, It Should Not Be Amended, 138
F.R.D. 631, 631 (1991) (stating that "It]he Rules were designed to depend primarily upon lawyer-
adversaries and sensible triers of fact to evaluate conflicts").
129. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
130. Id. at 2794-95.
131. Id. at 2795. Justice Blackmun criticized Chief Justice Rehnquist: "The Chief Justice
'do[es] not doubt that Rule 702 confides to the judge some gatekeeping responsibility,'... but
would neither say how it does so, nor explain what that role entails. We believe the better course
is to note the nature and source of the duty." Id. at 2795 n.7.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2795.
134. Id.
135. Id. "The term 'applies to any body of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred from
such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds.'" Id. (quoting Webster's Third New Interna.
tional Dictionary 1252 (Merriam-Webster, 1986)).
136. Daubert, 113 S. Ct at 2795.
137. Id. "We note that scientists typically distinguish between 'validity' (does the principle
support what it purports to show?) and 'reliability' (does application of the principle produce
consistent results?)." Id. (quoting Black, 56 Fordham L. Rev. at 599 (cited in note 55)).
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fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue. 13 8 Thus,
admitted testimony also must be relevant.13
These requirements of reliability and relevance are not surpris-
ing considering that experts are permitted wide latitude to offer
opinions under Rule 702.140 Trial judges must make a preliminary
assessment about whether proffered testimony will (1) contain
scientific knowledge, and (2) assist the trier of fact.141 Justice
Blackmun and the Daubert majority realized that many factors will
affect these inquiries, and concluded that some general observations
were appropriate.142 Accordingly, the Court identified several relevant
questions that trial courts must ask when assessing expert testimony.
The first pertinent question is whether the theory or technique
can be tested.43 This question is relevant to the status of the theory
or technique as scientific knowledge.14 Courts must then determine
the degree to which the theory or technique has been scrutinized by
peer review and publication.145 This question is similar to the general
acceptance question in Frye but is not outcome-determinative. Publi-
cation is no longer a sine qua non of admissibility; it does not always
go hand-in-hand with reliability, and in some cases reliable but inno-
vative theories will not yet have been published.i4 A trial court also
138. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795 (quoting FRE 702).
139. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
140. Id. at 2796. The Court observed:
Unlike an ordinary witness, see Rule 701, an expert is permitted wide latitude to offer
opinions, including those that are not based on first-hand knowledge or observation. See
Rules 702 and 703. Presumably, this relaxation of the usual requirement of first-hand
knowledge-a rule which represents "a 'most persuasive manifestation' of the common
law insistence upon 'the most reliable sources of information,'" Advisory Committee's
Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 602-is premised on an assumption that the expert's opinion will
have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline.
Id.
141. Id. The Court specifically stated that Rule 702's requirements of reliability and rele-
vance do not apply only to unconventional evidence but noted that "theories that are so firmly es-
tablished as to have attained the status of scientific law, such as the laws of thermodynamics,
properly are subject to judicial notice under Fed. Rule Evid. 201." Id. at 2796 n.7.
142. Id. at 2796.
143. Id. at 2797.
144. Id. "Scientific methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and testing them
to see if they can be falsified; indeed this methodology is what distinguishes science from other
fields of human inquiry." Green, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 645 (cited in note 117) (quoted in Daubert,
113 S. Ct. at 2796).
145. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
146. Id. (citing Sheila Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisors as Policymakers 61-76
(Harvard U., 1990), and David F. Horrobin, The Philosophical Basis of Peer Review and the
Suppression of Innovation, 263 J.A.M.A. 1438 (1990)). The Court further stated, "Some
propositions, moreover, are too particular, too new, or of too limited interest to be published. But
submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a component of 'good science,' in part
because it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected."
Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797 (citing John M. Ziman, Reliable Knowledge: An Exploration of the
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should consider the known or potential rate of error of any technique
used, and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the
technique's operation. 14' 7 Finally, the court may consider the degree of
acceptance of the theory or technique. 14 Justice Blackmun inter-
preted the Third Circuit's opinion in Downing to say that an assess-
ment of reliability does not require, though it does permit, the specific
identification of a relevant expert community and an assessment of
the degree of acceptance therein. 49
The Daubert majority emphasized that the inquiry envisioned
by Rule 702 is a flexible one.' ° Throughout a judge's assessment of
proffered testimony, he must keep in mind all of the Rules.1 51
Specifically, trial courts must remember Rule 403, which permits the
exclusion of relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by dangers of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or
misleading the jury. 52 The majority apparently was confident that
federal judges will be capable gatekeepers of expert testimony armed
only with these general guidelines and their own discretion and
judgment.'5
C. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Dissent
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred
with the majority in part, and dissented in part.1m He agreed that
Frye did not survive the enactment of the Rules. 155 The Chief Justice
disagreed, however, with the majority's desire to make general obser-
vations about the correct way to apply Rule 702.'5 He noted that
general observations of the Supreme Court carry great weight with
Grounds for Belief in Science 130-33 (Cambridge U., 1978); Arnold S. Relman and Marcia Angell,
How Good Is Peer Review?, 321 New Eng. J. Med. 827 (1989)).
147. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
148. Id.
149. Id. (quoting Downing, 753 F.2d at 1238).
150. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2798 (quoting FRE 403).
153. Justice Blackmun and the majority expressly addressed some of the important underly-
ing concerns of the parties and amici in Daubert. Justice Blackmun dismissed fears that abandon-
ment of the general acceptance test would lead to a "free-for-all" in which "befuddled juries [would
be] confounded by absurd and irrational pseudoscientific assertions," stressing that these
problems could be solved by vigorous cross-examination and careful instruction on the burden of
proof-the traditional means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at
2798.





lower courts but suffer from the flaw of vagueness. 15 Therefore, the
Court should proceed cautiously when commenting on the Rules,
especially when, as here, issues of scientific method and validity are
present, because these issues are well outside the expertise of
judges.15 The danger with expounding on these issues, according to
Chief Justice Rehnquist, is that the Court's reach easily can exceed its
grasp.159
The Chief Justice also disagreed with the substance of the
majority's observations.160 The Rules clearly exclude evidence that is
not relevant,161 but the Daubert majority read Rule 702 as also exclud-
ing evidence that is not reliable. 62 The majority read Rule 702 as
stating that any scientific knowledge imparted by an expert witness
must be reliable because the Rule requires the knowledge to be
derived from the scientific method.'63 The Chief Justice's first
disagreement with this general observation was that the majority did
not indicate clearly whether this dicta relates only to experts seeking
to testify as to scientific knowledge, or whether it also applies to
experts seeking to address technical or specialized knowledge, to
which Rule 702 also applies.64 Chief Justice Rehnquist astutely
questioned the difference between scientific and technical knowledge,
asking whether the drafters of Rule 702 actually contemplated that
the phrase "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge" would
be divided into several subspecies of expertise. 65 The Chief Justice
also criticized the majority for asking too much of trial court judges. 66
He acknowledged that Rule 702 confides to trial judges some
gatekeeping responsibility in determining the admissibility of expert
testimony, but did not think that it imposes on them an obligation to




160. Id. at 2800.
161. Chief Justice Rehnquist does not disagree with this basic reading of Rule 402. Id.
162. Justice Blackmun and the majority read Rule 702's admission of testimony based on sci-
entific knowledge to require implicitly that evidence admitted under the Rule be reliable. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. Rule 702 also aplies to expert testimony regarding technical or specialized knowl-
edge. See FRE 702.
165. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2800.
166. The Chief Justice pointed to a passage of the majority opinion that states that "the
criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability." Id. at
2797. He then stated, "I defer to no one in my confidence in federal judges; but I am at a loss to
know what is meant when it is said that the scientific status of a theory depends on its




IV. ANALYSIS-THE POTENTIAL PITFALLS OF ABANDONING THE PEER
REVIEW STANDARD
A. Issues Unresolved by Daubert
Justice Blackmun's observations in Daubert failed to resolve
some issues related to the new test replacing Frye. For instance, as
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, Justice Blackmun failed to define the
scope of Daubert's dicta. Will the multifactor test that the majority
attached to Rule 702 apply to the proposed testimony of technical and
specialized experts as well as scientific experts? If so, application of
the test will be awkward, if not impossible, in a nonscientific setting.
After all, the majority's reading of a reliability requirement implicit in
the text of Rule 702 is based directly on the concept of the scientific
method.16S If this reliability requirement is implicit in the words
"scientific knowledge," should not some reliability requirement also
attach to the words "technical knowledge" and "specialized knowl-
edge"? Unfortunately, no easily identifiable technical or specialized
equivalent to the scientific method exists. The majority's recommen-
dations for district court judges do not enlighten them on how to deal
with issues of nonscientific reliability.
What test of reliability can judges apply to technical and spe-
cialized testimony? Certainly not the Frye general acceptance test, for
it traditionally has determined only the admissibility of scientific
evidence,69 and regardless of its historical application, Rule 702 has
displaced it. Apparently, judges must examine technical and special-
ized testimony under Rule 702 alone, without the benefit of Daubert's
general observations. This requirement seems strange because the
text of Rule 702 does not clearly indicate that its drafters intended
scientific experts to be treated differently than their technical and
specialized counterparts. In fact, the grouping of all expert testimony
168. The Daubert majority read the words "scientific knowledge" to require that "an infer-
ence or assertion must be derived by the scientific method.... In short, the requirement that an
expert's testimony pertain to 'scientific knowledge' establishes a standard of evidentiary reliabil-
ity." Id. at 2795. The Court observed, "Scientific methodology today is based on generating
hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified; indeed, this methodology is what
distinguishes science from other fields of human inquiry." Id. at 2796 (quoting Green, 86 Nw. U.
L. Rev. at 645 (cited in note 117)).
169. The Frye decision speaks only in terms of scientific principles or discoveries. Frye v.
United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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under one rule suggests that courts should admit all experts under the
same standard.
Another issue unresolved by Daubert concerns the standard of
review of trial judges' decisions about admissibility made pursuant to
Daubert's new, flexible inquiry. Will the standard of review of
Daubert decisions be different than the de novo standard applied
under Frye?170  Under the Frye rule, appellate courts generally re-
viewed admissibility decisions de novo because the same information
needed to reach a conclusion about general acceptance was equally
available to the appellate court. Thus, the appellate court could take
its own head count of experts and determine the extent to which a
scientific method was accepted. Ordinarily, however, evidentiary
rulings are reviewed only for an abuse of discretion 171 because the trial
court is usually in the best position to make credibility determinations
and to balance the probative value of proffered evidence against the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, or delay.172 The multifactor
judgment that Daubert requires is exactly the type of balancing
decision that normally is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. If
Daubert decisions are reviewed with this deference, inconsistent
decisions concerning the admissibility of novel scientific testimony
may go unchecked from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from judge to
judge. This inconsistent standard of review inevitably may lead to
more forum shopping in toxic tort and other complex litigation and
confound efforts to provide uniformity under the Rules.
B. Daubert's Future Effect on Junk Science
Supporters of Daubert believe that the Court's new guidance on
how to apply Rule 702 will provide a better test of admissibility than
the Frye test.173 Although Daubert may allow courts to admit some
scientific evidence that they would have excluded under Frye because
the evidence has not been generally accepted, the evidence, in theory,
should be scientifically reliable. More importantly perhaps, Daubert
could bar evidence that is generally accepted but cannot meet the new
170. See, for example, Cella v. United States, 998 F.2d 418, 423 (7th Cir. 1993).
171. See, for example, United States v. Merrill, 746 F.2d 458, 465 (9th Cir. 1984).
172. See FRE 403.
173. See, for example, Thomas W. Kirby, Junking Bad Science; The Court Didn't Just Dump
the Old Test for Scientific Testimony This Term; It Set Up Trial Judges as the Arbiters of What's
Junk and What's Not, The Connecticut Law Tribune (Aug. 2, 1993) (stating, "Daubert recognizes
that scientific barbarians are at the gates. Rather than sealing the gates to all innovative
scientists, however, Daubert authorizes and requires the trial judge to act as a careful and
discerning gatekeeper.").
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multifactor test of scientific reliability. 17 4  Perhaps the Frye test
survived so long because judges and lawyers were comfortable with it
and because it allowed them to avoid determining the reliability of
scientific evidence themselves. 175 Although Frye may have simplified
matters for the judiciary, it arguably did not provide the true scrutiny
of expert testimony that today's complex litigation demands. Without
this scrutiny, Daubert's new flexible inquiry may be the only way to
control today's proliferation of the battle of the experts.176  Federal
judges, as Daubert gatekeepers, no longer will be able to avoid scruti-
nizing issues of scientific reliability. With more scientific education
seminars for judges and more judicial clerks with scientific back-
grounds, Daubert may potentially act as a better filter for unreliable
scientific testimony than Frye.
More likely, however, Daubert will create problems in federal
district courts. It almost certainly will lead to an increase in the
amount of novel, scientific testimony that parties attempt to introduce
into trials.' 7" Most of the evidence admitted, hopefully, will be valid
and reliable, but some junk science undoubtedly will be included.
Parties may be forced to provide secondary experts to explain their
experts' methodology to novice scientists on the bench. 78  Unable
174. Theoretically, at least, judges under Daubert will make their own inquiries into the reli-
ability of expert testimony, rather than merely rely on a head count of experts. In this situation,
some theories or methods that traditionally have been considered sound, and still generate
general support in a given field, may be discredited by recent scientific breakthroughs or develop-
ments. Thus, Daubert possibly will help to bar admission of outdated ideas.
175. David 0. Stewart, A New Test: Decision Creates Uncertain Future for Admissibility of
Expert Testimony, 79 A.B.A. J. 48,51 (Nov. 1993).
176. Id.
177. Parties no longer will be deterred from trying to introduce experts who will bolster their
arguments, even if the experts are at the fringe of the scientific community and plan to testify
about theories that have gained little, if any, support among the experts' peers. Although
Daubert allows the degree of acceptance of testimony to play a part in the determination of its
admissibility, without lack of acceptance being exclusionary in and of itself, parties often will try
to admit questionable evidence. Even if Daubert eventually does filter out all unreliable testi-
mony, federal trial courts still may be deluged with proffered testimony to screen.
178. One undisputable drawback of abandoning a peer review standard of admissibility and
placing the trial court judge in the role of sole gatekeeper is time. Daubert's multifactor inquiry
undoubtedly will take longer than Frye's head count:
The Third Circuit's experience with its Downing test is instructive. In DeLuca v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.[, 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990)], the district judge on remand
was ordered to conform to the Downing test in evaluating the expert testimony at issue.
This required him to conduct a hearing held on five separate days, followed by extensive
post-hearing submissions of the parties, in order to determine whether [one witness's]
testimony is admissible. Thus, when expert testimony is challenged, federal district judges
can expect to spend a substantial portion of their already precious time satisfying the
factors of the Daubert test.
Dyk and Castanias, 15 Nat'l L. J. at 18 (cited in note 37).
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merely to rely on the tried and true general acceptance standard,
judges surely will admit some untested theories. Some of these theo-
ries will be unreliable. Daubert places great faith in the judiciary, and
the liberal Rules place great faith in juries to filter out unreliable
evidence, hoping that vigorous cross-examination will discredit it. The
system actually should work this way. Yet, cross-examination is not
as effective a fiter as peer review. Neither courts, parties, nor juries
have the time, expertise, or money to evaluate independently the
degree to which each piece of testimony is rooted in the scientific
method. Put simply, the Daubert test is excessively cumbersome and
too variable.
C. The Failed Amendment to Rule 702
In 1991, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of
the Judicial Conference of the United States recommended amending
Rule 702 to reduce the use of expert testimony by requiring a higher
degree of relevance and introducing a reliability requirement into the
text of the Rule. 179 The drafters of the proposed amendment intended
it to limit the use but increase the utility and reliability of opinion
testimony bearing on scientific issues.l s° They suggested the amend-
ment in reaction to the increasingly costly and complicated use of junk
science in federal litigation.81 The drafters did not intend the pro-
179. The proposal to amend Rule 702 was made in August, 1991. The premise of the
amendment was that the courts already had abandoned Frye. The proposed rule reads:
Testimony providing scientific, technical, or other specialized information, in the form of
an opinion or otherwise, may be permitted only if (1) the information is reasonably reli-
able and will substantially assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue, and (2) the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, ex-
perience, training, or education to provide such testimony. Except with leave of court for
good cause shown, the witness shall not testify on direct examination in any civil action to
any opinion or inference, or reason or basis therefor, that has not been seasonably dis-
closed as required by Rules 26(a)(2) and 26(e)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal
Rules of Evidence (1991) (proposed amendment to FRE 702) ("Preliminary Draft") (emphasis
added).
180. Advisory Committee's Notes to Proposed Amendments to FRE 702.
181. The Committee asserted:
The use of such testimony has increased greatly since enactment of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. This result was intended by the drafters of the rule, who were responding to
concerns that the restraints previously imposed on expert testimony were artificial and an
impediment to the illumination of technical issues in dispute. See, for example, Cleary,
ed., McCormick on Evidence § 203 [(cited in note 77)]. While much expert testimony now
presented is illuminating and useful, much is not, virtually all is expensive, if not to the
proponent then to adversaries. Particularly in civil litigation with high financial stakes,
large expenditures for marginally useful expert testimony has become commonplace.
Procurement of expert testimony is occasionally used as a trial technique to wear down
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posed Rule, while requiring a greater degree of relevance and reliabil-
ity, to mandate a complete return to the strict requirements of Frye. 182
Although the suggested Rule's text does not say so explicitly, it would
call on courts to reject testimony based on premises lacking significant
support within the scientific community, or that otherwise would be of
little help to the factfinder. 1m The Committee clearly recognized that
Rule 702 had replaced Frye, yet thought that the current Rule's
overbroad phrasing allows too much expert testimony into federal
trials.18 The Committee did not anticipate Daubert, however, as the
proposal's text does little to indicate the manner in which the reliabil-
ity of expert testimony should be judged.185 Unfortunately, Congress
has not enacted even this limited proposed amendment to Rule 702.
V. CLARIFYING THE FEDERAL RULE ON EXPERT TESTIMONY
Daubert's idyllic general observations do not provide a man-
ageable and consistent method for judging the admissibility of expert
testimony. Truly independent assessment of the reliability of every
piece of proposed scientific testimony soon may prove to be a logistical
nightmare, yet the Rules provide no easier test. Unfortunately, Con-
gress has not accepted the Advisory Committee's amendment to Rule
702.m By clarifying Rule 702, however, the right balance between
practicality and flexibility can be found.187 Congress should consider
an amendment that will produce accurate, consistent results without
requiring judges to expend time they do not have playing amateur
adversaries. In short, while testimony from experts may be desirable if not crucial in
many cases, excesses cannot be doubted and should be curtailed.
Advisory Committee's Notes to Proposed Amendments to FRE 702.
182. Advisory Committee's Notes to Proposed Amendments to FRE 702 (citing Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
183. Advisory Committee's Notes to Proposed Amendments to FRE 702.
184. The danger of junk science has grown, and the Advisory Committee recognized this:
While concern for the quality and even the integrity of hired testimony is not new .... the
hazards to the judicial process have increased as more technical evidence is presented:
"When the evidence relates to highly technical matters and each side has shopped for ex-
perts favorable to its position, it is naive to expect the trier of fact to be capable of assess-
ing the validity of dramatically opposed testimony."
Id. (quoting Weinstein and Berger, 3 Weinstein's Evidence 706[01] at 706-07 (cited in note 9)).
185. Aside from weakly invoking Frye in the Committee's Notes by calling on courts to
"reject testimony that is based upon premises lacking any significant support and acceptance
within the scientific community," the amended Rule offers no concrete criteria by which to judge
reliability. See Advisory Committee's Notes to Proposed Amendments to FRE 702.
186. The Committee's proposed amendment to Rule 702 is still available for consideration.
187. Adding a more direct statement establishing peer review as the cornerstone of any
inquiry into the reliability of expert testimony could improve the proposed Rule.
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scientist. To do this while avoiding the pitfalls of Frye, any new ver-
sion of Rule 702 must allow the more qualified scientific community to
determine most questions of scientific reliability without automati-
cally excluding ideas merely because they have not been tested uni-
versally. A new Rule 702 would do well to establish explicitly a rebut-
table presumption that only testimony (whether scientific, technical,
or specialized) derived by using methodology that has gained signifi-
cant acceptance in the appropriate field is admissible. 18
An improved Rule 702 might read as follows: If scientific,
technical, or other specialized information will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise only if (1)
the information is reasonably reliable, and (2) the witness is qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to
provide that testimony.
Information normally will be considered reasonably reliable if
it is based on premises, or derived from techniques, having significant
support and acceptance within the relevant specialized community. A
party seeking to object to a witness testifying thereto must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the information is not reasonably
reliable.
Information based on premises or derived from techniques not
having significant support and acceptance within the relevant special-
ized community normally will not be considered reasonably reliable.
A party seeking to have an expert base her testimony on this type of
evidence must show by a preponderance of the evidence that this
information is reasonably reliable.189
This amended Rule would serve a number of purposes. First, it
would retain a firm emphasis on relevance by requiring that expert
testimony assist the trier of fact. Second, like the Advisory
188. Professor Paul C. Gianneili has advocated placing a special burden on the admissibility
of novel scientific evidence. He argues that (1) the burden of admissibility should require a
showing of reliability by a preponderance of the evidence in civil cases and beyond a reasonable
doubt in criminal cases, (2) the proponent of the evidence should have the burden of production
and persuasion, and (3) the judge should decide the issue of whether the burden of proof has been
satisfied as a preliminary question of fact. See Giannelli, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197 (cited in note 9).
See also Stephen A. Saltzburg, Standards of Proof and Preliminary Questions of Fact, 27 Stan. L.
Rev. 271, 292 (1975) (arguing that "an enhanced burden of proof [should be required] whenever
there is something extraordinary about a particular kind of fact question or type of evidence").
189. This proposal is derived in part from the current Rule 702, the Advisory Committee's
proposed Rule 702, and Professor Giannelli's proposal. Unlike Professor Giannelli's suggestion of
requiring a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in criminal cases, which seems to run contrary to
the intended liberal nature of the Rules, this proposal seeks to preserve the original intent of the
Rules-to admit as much relevant evidence as possible-while still establishing an increased
burden on the admissibility of expert testimony.
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Committee's proposal, it would introduce a requirement that the
testimony be reasonably reliable. This proposal, however, would
address Daubert directly by establishing in the text of Rule 702 that
peer review and acceptance should be the primary indicators of reli-
able expert testimony. Unlike Frye, though, it would not work as an
absolute bar against admitting theories that are not generally
accepted. Rather, it merely would establish a presumption that these
theories are not reliable enough to be admitted.
By placing the burden on the proponent of testimony that is
not generally accepted to show its reliability by a preponderance of the
evidence, the enactment of a Rule similar to the one proposed in this
Recent Development would discourage junk science by making it
difficult, but not impossible, to introduce an expert's novel ideas if his
theories have not yet gained significant support among his peers. 190
The proposed Rule also would limit the number of objections to ac-
cepted theories by requiring the objecting party to make a showing of
unreliability by a preponderance of the evidence. 191
Any amendment to Rule 702 should directly address the fate of
Frye, the problems of Daubert, and the continuing need for peer
review of expert testimony. Although the liberal stature of the Rules
generally operates to allow juries to hear as much relevant evidence
as possible, permitting them to reach fully informed and deliberate
decisions, this policy creates problems with regard to expert testi-
190. As Professor Gianneili argued, the cost and effort of obtaining and presenting other ex-
pert opinions or evidence supporting novel methodology should be borne by the testimony's
proponent. See Giannelli, 80 Colum. L. Rev. at 1244-45 (cited in note 9). Pragmatism demands
that the admittance of expert testimony that is not significantly accepted be the exception to a
rule that seeks to allow most issues of scientific reliability to be determined by scientists. A
rebuttable presumption against admitting testimony that has not been significantly accepted,
with the burden of rebutting the presumption falling on the testimony's proponent, furthers this
goal.
By requiring that proposed testimony be significantly accepted, this Recent Development's
proposal seeks to avoid creating a rigid requirement that a pure majority of experts in a field
accept a certain methodology. In some fields, acceptance by a significant portion of a body of
experts may indicate sufficient reliability for admittance; in other more stable fields, however,
courts should require acceptance by a majority. The language "significant acceptance" seeks to
allow trial judges some flexibility in determining what degree of acceptance merits judicial notice.
See United States v. Gould, 741 F.2d 45, 49 (4th Cir. 1984). In Gould, the court advocated a
substantial acceptance standard and stated: "This is a less stringent test than the 'general
acceptance' test first announced in Frye .... and since widely adopted as a foundational test of
relevance for all kinds of scientific evidence. While less stringent, it nevertheless remains a test
of relevance dependent upon some degree of proven acceptance within the appropriate discipline
of the 'generalized proposition that constitutes the major premise of the relevance syllogism.'" Id.
191. Simple considerations of efficiency should discourage most challenges to the admissibil-
ity of testimony derived from accepted methodology, and the onus should be on a party objecting
to testimony that has been significantly accepted to show clearly that it is not grounded in reliable
scientific, technical, or specialized methodology.
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mony. The long-standing problem still exists-testimony bearing an
aura of scientific authority exerts an undue influence on impression-
able and trusting juries. 192 In fact, the problem continues to grow.
Litigation in many fields, such as toxic torts and products liability,
has become so technical that the issues in a case may be almost com-
pletely beyond the grasp of many jurors. Relaxing the criteria for
admitting evidence in general may make sense, but Congress would
do well to put more conservative restraints on this trend with regard
to expert testimony. A compromise between the extremes of Frye's
absolute bar and Daubert's cumbersome balancing could be reached
most effectively by amending Rule 702 to provide fair and workable
criteria for admitting expert testimony.
VI. CONCLUSION
Some commentators have seen the demise of the general accep-
tance standard as a victory, permitting challenges to principles that
might be blindly, though generally, accepted.193 After all, some have
argued that even the views of Einstein and Galileo were not immedi-
ately accepted, and that Copernicus was adjudged a heretic.194
Therefore, the mainstream is clearly not infallible, and our courts
should not passively perpetuate the status quo. 195
The preceding position springs from a dangerously inaccurate
view of the role of our legal system. Our judiciary exists to dispense
justice, to settle interpersonal disputes, and to interpret the law. It
does not exist to drive the limits of scientific research. The theories of
Einstein, Galileo, and Copernicus were given legitimacy only through
testing and retesting by their professional peers, not by the vote of a
jury or the approval of a judge. How many laypersons on a jury would
have been able to make use of the quantum physics of Einstein before
the research community had received these concepts favorably? How
many judges would be able to assess independently the reliability of
Einstein's theories even today? For every new scientific paradigm
that is accepted as reliable by experts in any given field, countless
others are considered and rejected. Our system should not contem-
192. Courts fear that expert testimony will have an undue influence on juries because people
generally believe that science is objective, and thus unerring.
193. See Richard J. Heleniak, Expert Testimony After Daubert; So What's New?, The Legal
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plate that judges and juries can make amateur assessments of the
merits of new research. That work should be left to the more capable
scientific community. 19 Although the mainstream is not infallible,
faith in the mainstream is a necessary commitment to reliability and
consistency within the law. 197
The current version of Rule 702 has proven to be too vague to
provide a clear standard for admitting expert testimony. For nineteen
years, it has allowed courts to assess proferred scientific testimony as
liberally or as conservatively as they please. The Supreme Court's
latest interpretation of the Rule makes this failing all too clear.
Daubert did well to recognize that peer review should be a relevant
factor in the admissibility of expert testimony, but its general
observations obscured the fact that this review must continue to be
the primary focus of the inquiry. To correct this, Congress should
adopt an amended Rule 702 that returns the ability to judge scientific
reliability to the scientific community.
Alan W. Tamarelli, Jr.
196. A true understanding of the bulk of modern science is only available to experts:
[T]he creative scientist can begin his research where he leaves off and thus concentrate
exclusively upon the subtlest and most esoteric aspects of the natural phenomena that
concern his group. And as he does this, his research communiqu4s will begin to change in
ways whose evolution has been too little studied but whose modern end products are obvi-
ous to all and oppressive to many. No longer will his researches usually be embodied in
books addressed, like Franklin's Experiments . .. On Electricity or Darwin's Origin of
Species, to anyone who might be interested in the subject matter of the field. Instead they
will usually appear as brief articles addressed only to professional colleagues, the men
whose knowledge of a shared paradigm can be assumed and who prove to be the only ones
able to read the papers addressed to them.
Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 20 (U. of Chicago, 2d ed. 1970).
197. Faith in the scientific status quo not only provides our judicial system with predictabil-
ity and consistency-two prerequisites of justice-but also allows scientific advancement to run
its normal course:
Without commitment to a paradigm there could be no normal science.... [Ilt is not only
normal science that depends upon a commitment to a paradigm. If existing theory binds
the scientist only with respect to existing applications, then there can be no surprises,
anomalies, or crises. But these are just the signposts that point the way to extraordinary
science. If positivistic restrictions on the range of a theory's legitimate applicability are
taken literally, the mechanism that tells the scientific community what problems may
lead to fundamental change must cease to function. And when that occurs, the commu-
nity will inevitably return to something much like its pre-paradigm state, a condition in
which all members practice science but in which their gross product scarcely resembles
science at all. Is it really any wonder that the price of significant scientific advance is a
commitment that runs the risk of being wrong?
Id. at 100-01.

